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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHY P. BINGHAM, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DAVID P. BINGHAM, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 920508 
STATEMENT REGARDING REPLY BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Appellee previously filed a Cross-Appeal, and 
has now filed her Brief. Pursuant to Rule 24(h), Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Appellee's Brief contains her 
issues and arguments raised by her Cross-Appeal, as well as 
her Answer to Appellant's Brief. Pursuant to Rule 24(c), 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant files this 
Brief as a Reply Brief and in response to issues presented 
by the Cross-Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. The Court did not error in its interpretation of 
Section 78-45-7.5(4) by allowing money spent for the 
purchase of assets to be deducted as a necessary expense for 
self-employment or business operations. The Court correctly 
1 
applied the section in question regarding the purchase of 
assets. 
2. The Court's refusal to classify principal payouts 
on loans as necessary expenses for self-employment or 
business operations was an error, and a misapplication of 
Section 78-45-7.5(4) . 
3. The Trial Court abused its discretion in awarding 
alimony. The Court clearly has power to award alimony 
equalizing the parties1 living standards and attempting to 
maintain them at a level as close as possible to the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. The Court's 
error was in miscalculating the amount of defendant's 
income, and in awarding an amount of alimony greater than 
plaintiff's need. 
4. The Trial Court erred in failing to subtract the 
gift from defendant's parents prior to calculating the 
equity in the defendant's business. 
5. The Trial Court erred in determining that the feed 
inventory was part of the equity to be divided. 
6. The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in 
ordering each party to pay its own attorney's fees and 
costs. 
STflTEMSNT 9F FftCTg 
Refer to Appellant's original Brief. Appellee's Brief 
2 
contains one major error in its Statement of Facts, on Page 
3, the first sentence of the second paragraph, wherein she 
states that "Bingham Dairy was purchased by the couple in 
1982." In fact, Bingham Dairy was incorporated in 1982 to 
purchase an existing dairy. Defendant and his father 
incorporated Bingham Dairy, and plaintiff has never had any 
ownership interest whatsoever in Bingham Dairy. (Tr, p. 
174,) 
ARGlftiENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT PROPERLY APPLIED SECTION 78-45-7.5(4), 
BY ALLOWING MONEY SPENT FOR THE PURCHASE OF ASSETS 
TO BE DEDUCTED AS A NECESSARY EXPENSE FOR SELF-
EMPLOYMENT OR BUSINESS OPERATIONS. 
The Trial Court, without the benefit of explanatory 
factual findings, decided that money spent for the purchase 
of assets is an appropriate self-employment deduction, while 
at the same time ruling that principal payouts on loans are 
not. 
Defendants position is that both should be allowed as 
deductions, because both represent money reasonably and 
necessarily expended for self-employment or business 
operation. 
The Court is referred to Appellant's original Brief, 
Point I, beginning on Page 10 of the Brief. That argument, 
which refers in turn to defendant's Exhibit 4, explains 
3 
defendant's argument thoroughly. 
POINT II 
THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO CLASSIFY PRINCIPAL PAYOUTS 
ON LOANS AS A NECESSARY EXPENSE FOR SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
OR BUSINESS OPERATION WAS ERROR. 
This issue is thoroughly discussed in Point I of 
Appellant's original Brief, and Point I immediately above. 
Any further discussion would be repetitive. 
POINT III 
THE ALIMONY AWARD WAS IN ERROR. 
In Point I of his original Brief, defendant shows that 
the Court erred by calculating his income improperly. This 
resulted in both the alimony and child support calculations 
being improperly high. Furthermore, in Point II of his 
original Brief, defendant shows that the Court further erred 
by awarding more alimony than plaintiff's own evidence 
established as her need. 
The Trial Court certainly has discretion to equalize 
and maintain the standard of living comparable to that 
enjoyed during the marriage. 
The issue in this case is whether or not the Court, 
through its misinterpretation of Section 78-45-7.5(4), 
calculated defendant's income incorrectly. The issue for 
consideration is the amount of alimony which should have 
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been awarded; if this Court determines that the Trial Court 
incorrectly calculated defendant's income, then the issue of 
alimony must be reconsidered, and the amount awarded reduced 
correspondingly. 
Plaintiff ran her household, paid all of her living 
expenses, and took care of the children on a draw of $2,000 
per month. (Tr, p. 75; p. 193.) She testified that she 
needed alimony of $1,500 per month (Tr, p. 44, lines 8-22; 
p. 45, lines 23-25), and submitted her Exhibit 16 showing 
her current monthly expenses to be $2,035. 
The Trial Court correctly awarded plaintiff the home, 
and her new Van, neither of which requires a monthly 
payment. That is exactly what plaintiff had prior to the 
divorce, except for the additional $2,000 per month to run a 
household consisting of herself, all of the children, and 
her husband. Her husband is no longer part of her 
household; if her standard of living is maintained exactly 
as it was prior to the termination of the marriage, her 
total alimony and child support should be somewhat less than 
$2,000 per month. The Court awarded $3,181. 
The alimony issues are discussed and argued in Point I 
and II of Appellant's Brief. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUBTRACT A GIFT FROM 
DEFENDANT'S PARENTS IN CALCULATING THE DAIRY EQUITY. 
5 
Appellee's argument in her Point IV partially misses 
the point. 
In this particular case, the focus is upon the source 
of the property. Defendant agrees that property accumulated 
by joint efforts of the parties should be divided equally 
between the parties, or at least be subject to equitable 
division. 
A careful reading of Appellant's Point III in his 
original Brief would show that defendant assumes the total 
appraised value of the dairy to be the beginning point. 
This approach accounts for and allows any appreciation in 
the dairy assets, and treats such appreciation as a joint 
asset. The issue is whether the amount of the gift 
($174,000) should be deducted from that total equity. 
Appellant's Point III addresses this issue; to the 
extent Appellee's Point IV does not, she misses the point. 
POINT V 
THE FEED INVENTORY IS NOT PART OF THE 
EQUITY TO BE DIVIDED. 
This issue is thoroughly discussed in Appellant's Point 
IV, in his original Brief. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
REQUIRING EACH PARTY TO PAY ITS OWN ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
6 
The Trial Court clearly has discretion to award 
attorney's fees in a divorce case, pursuant to the standards 
enunciated by the cases quoted in plaintiff's Point V of her 
Brief. 
The Court is to base its decision upon evidence of the 
financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the 
other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the fees. 
The award of the attorney's fees must be based upon 
evidence of the financial need of the receiving spouse, the 
ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness 
of the requested fees. See Bell vs. Bell, 810 P2d 489 (Utah 
App. 1991). Sufficient evidence must be offered regarding 
attorney's fees at the trial. See Mauahan vs. Mauohan. 770 
P2d 156 (Utah App. 1989). 
In the instant case, no evidence regarding attorney's 
fees was presented, except as appears on Pages 53 and 54 of 
the record, where plaintiff's attorney asked if she wanted 
attorney's fees and if she was able to pay them. 
Plaintiff's counsel then merely stated that he would "submit 
an affidavit at the end of this matter". 
Plaintiff was not awarded attorney's fees, and should 
not be, because she presented no evidence at that trial in 
support of those fees. 
Concerning costs, at the end of the trial plaintiff's 
attorney asked to recall his expert witness for the purpose 
7 
of testifying to his fees and charges (Tr. p. 211, lines 1-
7). 
The parties, in effect, stipulated that plaintifffs 
expert witness fees could be submitted by affidavit. (Tr. 
p. 211, lines 8-13) . 
The Court then ordered that the attorneyfs fee 
affidavit proposed by plaintiff's counsel should be 
submitted along with a post-trial brief. (Tr. p. 211, lines 
14-19). 
There was never any stipulation regarding submitting 
attorney's fees by affidavit. 
Furthermore, it is submitted that the Court did 
consider the issue of attorney's fees and costs, and 
exercise its discretion properly, at least based upon the 
facts as the Court found them. The Court found that 
defendant had a gross monthly income of $5,587, of which he 
awarded $3,181 to the plaintiff, leaving defendant $2,406. 
Using these erroneous figures, it is respectfully submitted 
that the Court calculated the plaintiff had more money than 
the defendant, and could afford to pay her own attorney's 
fees and costs. 
Also, it is possible the Trial Court considered the 
argument raised by defendant in his post-trial brief 
regarding attorney's fees, found at Pages 186-187 of the 
Record, challenging the reasonableness of the fees. 
8 
CQNCfcVglQW 
The Trial Court's basic error in failing to allow 
principal payouts on loans as necessary expenses, pursuant 
to the applicable statute, resulted in the Court's award for 
child support and alimony being improperly high. 
Additionally, regarding the alimony, the Court awarded 
more than plaintiff's own testimony purportedly established 
as her need, and far more than the evidence established as 
her actual need. 
The failure to subtract the gift of $174,000 to 
defendant from the dairy equity resulted in an improper and 
inequitable property division; the Trial Court's error in 
determining that the feed inventory should be divided as 
part of the equity further compounded that error. 
The Court did not abuse its discretion by ordering each 
party to pay its own attorney's fees and costs; plaintiff 
failed to present evidence of attorney's fees in the 
required fashion, and the Court declined to award costs and 
fees because under the Court's ruling the plaintiff had a 
greater monthly income than the defendant. 
The Trial Court failed to make findings concerning any 
of these issues, leaving the Appellate Court to guess at the 
Trial Court's reasoning. The Trial Court is required to 
make adequate factual findings on all material issues, 
unless the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, 
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and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment. See Chambers vs. Chambers. 198 Utah Adv. Rep 49 
(Utah App. 1992); Haumont vs. Haumont, 793 P2d 421 (Utah 
App. 1990); Throckmorton vs. Throckmorton, 767 P2d 121 (Utah 
App. 1988); Acton vs. Deliran. 737 P2d 996 (Utah, 1987). 
In this particular case, the Trial Judge has resigned 
from the bench and is incapacitated, so any remand should be 
for a new trial. 
Defendant does not necessarily request a remand; in a 
divorce case, the Appellate Court can review the transcript 
and make its own findings and rulings. 
However, if this Court deems remand to be an 
appropriate remedy, it is requested that the Court rule on 
the core issue in this case, that being the proper 
interpretation of Section 78-45-7.5(4) as it applies to the 
purchase of assets and principal payouts on loans. 
DATED this day of x/0jrp^&*&A>t— 1992. 
JQtf jT BUNDERSON ON
ATTC ORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
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